



Effectiveness of Social Media Messages in Reducing Political Apathy Among Youths in South-East, Nigeria

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Abstract

This study examined the effectiveness of social media messages (Facebook and X) in reducing political apathy among youths in South-East, Nigeria. Two research questions and two null hypotheses guided this study. The study adopted a quasi-experimental pretest-posttest non-equivalent groups design involving two treatment groups. The population consisted of all youths aged 18 to 35 years residing in South-East Nigeria who are active users of Facebook and X. A sample of 39 youths was drawn and assigned into intact groups serving as Facebook and X intervention groups. Data were collected using a researcher-developed Political Apathy Scale with a reliability coefficient of 0.83 determined using Cronbach alpha. The experimental procedure spanned four weeks, during which participants received weekly political engagement messages through their respective platforms. Data were analyzed using means, standard deviations, and Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) at 0.05 level of significance. The findings revealed that Facebook-based political engagement messages produced significantly greater reduction in political apathy levels compared to X-based messages. While male youths demonstrated greater descriptive reductions in apathy levels than female youths, gender did not produce statistically significant effects on apathy outcomes when controlling for pretest scores. The study recommended that political mobilization organizations prioritize Facebook for delivering political engagement content, develop gender-inclusive intervention strategies, and integrate Facebook-based campaigns into broader voter mobilization efforts.

Keywords: Facebook, Gender, Political Apathy, Social Media, X (twitter), Youth

Introduction

Political apathy has garnered significant scholarly attention in recent years, with researchers offering various conceptualizations of the phenomenon. Ekman and Amnå (2012) define political apathy as a state of disengagement characterized by lack of interest, concern, or involvement in political processes and civic affairs. Similarly, Sloam (2016) describes it as a deliberate withdrawal from political participation stemming from feelings of powerlessness and disconnection from political institutions. The causes of political apathy among young people are complex and deeply rooted in both structural and individual factors. Dalton (2017) identifies institutional distrust as a primary driver, arguing that youth perceive political institutions as corrupt, ineffective, and unresponsive to their needs. Economic marginalization also plays a

significant role, as Kimberlee (2002) notes that unemployment and limited economic opportunities create a sense of exclusion that dampens political interest among young citizens. Fox (2015) highlights the role of inadequate civic education, contending that many educational systems fail to equip young people with the knowledge and skills necessary for meaningful political participation. Fieldhouse, Tranmer, and Russell (2007) point to socialization factors, suggesting that young people from politically inactive families are more likely to exhibit apathetic attitudes. Additionally, Loader, Vromen, and Xenos (2014) argue that the perceived irrelevance of traditional political processes to youth concerns contributes to their disengagement. Manning and Ryan (2004) further emphasize that negative political



campaigning and media cynicism reinforce feelings of alienation among young voters.

Political apathy among youths in South-East Nigeria has emerged as a critical concern in recent scholarly discourse. Nnamdi and Okechukwu (2018) observe that young people in the region demonstrate remarkably low voter turnout rates and minimal participation in political activities despite constituting a significant demographic. Eze and Nwankwo (2020) attribute this trend to historical marginalization and the perception that political power structures systematically exclude Igbo youth from meaningful decision-making processes. Okafor (2019) documents widespread disillusionment stemming from unfulfilled campaign promises and governance failures that have eroded youth confidence in political leadership. Ugwu and Onu (2021) note that the sit-at-home movements and civil unrest in the region have further complicated youth political engagement, creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. Research by Nnaji (2022) reveals that young people in South-East Nigeria often view politics as the preserve of the elite, leading to feelings of powerlessness and irrelevance. Chukwuemeka and Okonkwo (2017) argue that the combination of economic hardship, insecurity, and perceived ethnic discrimination has created a generation of politically disengaged youth who see little reason to participate in formal political processes.

Various interventions have been implemented to address the rising tide of political apathy among Nigerian youth, with mixed results. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) launched voter education campaigns aimed at increasing youth registration and participation, as documented by Adebayo (2019), though these initiatives have achieved limited success in changing attitudes. Civil society organizations such as YIAGA Africa and the Not Too Young To Run movement have championed youth political inclusion through advocacy and grassroots mobilization efforts (Jega & Ibeanu, 2021). Oluwole and Ojo (2020) report on town hall meetings and youth parliaments organized by governmental and non-governmental actors to bridge the gap between young citizens and political leaders. Traditional media campaigns, including radio and television programs focused on civic education, have been employed across the region (Udoka, 2018). However, Okoro and Nwafor (2021) observe that these conventional approaches have failed to resonate with tech-savvy youth who increasingly consume information through

digital platforms. This gap between traditional intervention methods and youth media consumption patterns has prompted scholars and practitioners to explore social media as a potentially more effective tool for political engagement (Amaechi, 2022). The recognition that young Nigerians spend considerable time on social networking platforms has shifted attention toward leveraging these digital spaces for civic mobilization and political communication.

Social media has revolutionized political communication and civic engagement globally, creating new pathways for youth participation in democratic processes. Boulianne (2015) argues that social media platforms facilitate information sharing, political discussion, and collective action in ways that traditional media cannot replicate. Vaccari and Valeriani (2015) demonstrate that social media use correlates positively with political participation, particularly among younger demographics who find these platforms more accessible and engaging than conventional political channels. Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela (2012) emphasize that social networking sites enable horizontal communication patterns that empower citizens to become active participants rather than passive consumers of political content. In the Nigerian context, Nnanyelugo and Nwafor (2013) note that social media has emerged as a crucial tool for political mobilization, enabling youth to organize protests, share political information, and hold leaders accountable. Abubakar and Dantiye (2020) observe that platforms such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, and WhatsApp have become primary sources of political news for Nigerian youth, surpassing traditional media in reach and influence. Ekwealor and Chinwuko (2021) highlight how the End SARS movement demonstrated the power of social media to mobilize young Nigerians around political causes, suggesting that digital platforms might offer solutions to political apathy when properly leveraged for civic education and engagement.

Facebook has established itself as a dominant social media platform with significant potential for political engagement and civic participation. Bode (2012) reports that Facebook's structure, which combines personal networking with information dissemination capabilities, makes it particularly effective for political communication among young users. Vitak et al. (2011) found that exposure to political content on Facebook increases political knowledge and participation,



especially among individuals who might otherwise avoid political information. Bond et al. (2012) conducted a large-scale experiment demonstrating that Facebook messages can directly influence voting behavior and political mobilization. In Nigeria, Ifukor (2010) documents how Facebook played a crucial role in mobilizing citizens during electoral periods, serving as a platform for voter education and political discourse. Omenugha and Oji (2013) observe that Nigerian youth use Facebook to express political opinions, share news about governance, and engage in discussions that might be constrained in offline spaces. Moyo (2009) suggests that Facebook's interactive features, including commenting, sharing, and reacting to posts, create opportunities for sustained political dialogue that can reduce apathy. Empirical evidence from Ekwealor (2022) indicates that politically themed Facebook pages and groups in South-East Nigeria attract significant youth engagement, suggesting the platform's potential effectiveness in addressing political disengagement in the region.

X (formerly Twitter) represents another powerful social media platform with distinct characteristics that may influence political engagement differently than Facebook. Jungherr (2016) characterizes X as a real-time information network particularly suited for political communication due to its immediacy and public nature. Tumasjan et al. (2010) found that political discourse on X mirrors offline political sentiment and can serve as an effective tool for political mobilization. Freelon, McIlwain, and Clark (2016) demonstrate that X facilitates the rapid spread of political messages and enables grassroots movements to gain visibility without traditional media gatekeepers. In the African context, Bosch (2017) documents how X has been instrumental in political activism, enabling citizens to challenge authoritarian practices and demand accountability. Nwagbara and Nwafor (2020) note that Nigerian youth activists effectively used X during the End SARS protests to coordinate activities, share real-time updates, and attract international attention to their cause. Adeyanju and Harwood (2021) argue that X's hashtag functionality creates digital communities around political issues, fostering a sense of collective identity that can counteract feelings of isolation and powerlessness.

Gender differences in political participation and social media use represent an important dimension that warrants careful examination in studies of political

apathy. Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) observe that women consistently report lower levels of political engagement than men across various contexts, a pattern attributed to socialization processes and structural barriers. Bode (2017) found that men and women use social media for political purposes differently, with women more likely to engage in social forms of participation such as sharing and discussing, while men tend toward more direct political actions. Conroy, Feezell, and Guerrero (2012) suggest that social media platforms may reduce gender gaps in political participation by providing less intimidating spaces for political expression. In Nigeria, Ette (2017) documents significant gender disparities in political participation, noting that cultural norms and socioeconomic factors limit women's political engagement. Nwangwu and Ononogbu (2014) report that young Nigerian women face additional barriers to political participation, including lower political efficacy and reduced access to political networks. However, Okoro-Telu (2021) provides evidence that social media has begun to transform this landscape, with young Nigerian women increasingly using platforms like Facebook and X to express political views and engage in civic discourse.

The justification for incorporating gender analysis into this study rests on substantial empirical evidence demonstrating differential patterns of political apathy and social media engagement between male and female youth. Verba, Burns, and Schlozman (1997) established that gender differences in political participation persist even when controlling for resources and civic skills, suggesting that interventions must account for these disparities. Research by Xenos, Vromen, and Loader (2014) reveals that social media impacts men and women's political engagement through different mechanisms, with implications for message design and targeting. In Nigeria specifically, Abubakar (2019) found that young women express higher levels of political cynicism than their male counterparts, partly due to exclusion from traditional political spaces. Ezeibe and Dioha (2020) provide evidence that interventions targeting political apathy achieve different success rates among male and female youth, with some approaches more effective for one gender than the other. Given that South-East Nigeria maintains strong patriarchal traditions that shape gender roles (Nwokocha, 2014), examining how Facebook and X messages differently affect male and female youth can inform more equitable and effective

strategies for reducing political apathy across gender lines.

The need for this study emerges from critical gaps in existing research and the urgent requirement for evidence-based approaches to youth political engagement in South-East Nigeria. While previous studies have established that political apathy exists among Nigerian youth (Omotola, 2009), limited research has systematically examined the effectiveness of specific social media platforms in addressing this problem within the South-East context. Okeke and Udu (2020) call for empirical investigations into how digital interventions can be optimized for local contexts, noting that most existing studies rely on Western populations and may not translate to Nigerian settings. The rapid evolution of social media use patterns, particularly following the End SARS movement (Olalere & Gbadegesin, 2021), necessitates updated research that reflects current digital engagement behaviors. Furthermore, the comparative effectiveness of different platforms such as Facebook versus X remains underexplored in Nigerian literature, despite evidence suggesting platform-specific effects on political behavior (Theocharis & Lowe, 2016). The gender dimension adds another layer of complexity that existing studies have inadequately addressed, with most research treating youth as a homogeneous category (Anazodo, Okoye & Chukwuemeka, 2012). As Nigeria approaches future electoral cycles and faces ongoing governance challenges, understanding which social media strategies effectively reduce political apathy among different segments of the youth population becomes increasingly critical for strengthening democratic participation and ensuring inclusive political processes.

Research Questions

The following research questions guided this study:

1. What difference exists in political apathy levels among youths in South-East Nigeria exposed to political engagement messages on Facebook and those exposed through X (formerly Twitter)?
2. What difference exists in political apathy levels between male and female youths in South-East Nigeria exposed to political engagement messages on Facebook and X (formerly Twitter)?

Hypotheses

The following null hypotheses were formulated and tested at 0.05 level of significance:

1. There is no significant difference in political apathy levels among youths in South-East Nigeria exposed to political engagement messages on Facebook and X (formerly Twitter).
2. There is no significant difference in political apathy levels between male and female youths in South-East Nigeria exposed to political engagement messages on Facebook and X (formerly Twitter).

Methods

Research Design

The study adopted a quasi-experimental pretest-posttest non-equivalent groups design involving two treatment groups. The design was suitable because intact groups were used, making randomisation impossible. The study was situated in South-East Nigeria, comprising Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo States, a region characterised by notable youth engagement with social media platforms and documented concerns about political disengagement among young people. The urban and semi-urban centres of South-East Nigeria provide an appropriate environment for examining the effectiveness of social-media-based political communication campaigns among young people.

Population and Sampling

The population for the study consisted of all youths aged 18 to 35 years residing in South-East Nigeria who are active users of social media platforms, particularly Facebook and X (formerly Twitter). This age group represents the most digitally engaged demographic and is particularly affected by political apathy. A sample of 39 youths (18 males and 21 females) was drawn using a multistage sampling procedure. Youth clusters with demonstrably active social media users were first identified purposively across tertiary institutions, vocational training centres, and community youth groups in South-East Nigeria. Convenience sampling was then applied to recruit eligible volunteers who met the criteria of age and social media usage. Participants were finally assigned into intact, naturally occurring groups which served as the Facebook intervention group and the X intervention group. Baseline equivalence of the groups was ascertained using pretest scores.

Instrument for Data Collection

The instrument for data collection consisted of a Political Apathy Scale (PAS). The PAS was a researcher-developed 30-item Likert-type scale that assessed youths' attitudes toward political participation and engagement. The scale was structured on a four-point response format ranging from Strongly Agree (4) to Strongly Disagree (1), with negatively worded items reverse-scored. The instrument was administered as both pretest and posttest. Face validation of the instrument was done. Three experts from the Faculty of Education examined the instrument for content coverage, clarity, appropriateness of language, and relevance to the study objectives. Their inputs informed revisions before full administration. Reliability was established through a pilot study conducted with youths in a location outside the study area but sharing similar demographic characteristics with South-East Nigeria. The internal consistency of the Political Apathy Scale was determined using Cronbach's Alpha, which yielded a coefficient of 0.83. Reliability coefficients of 0.70 and above are considered acceptable.

Method of Data Collection and Analysis

The experimental procedure spanned four weeks and began with the administration of the pretest to both groups. The Facebook treatment group participated in

a private Facebook group specifically created for the study. Within this platform, participants received one comprehensive political engagement message weekly, incorporating text, images, infographics, and educational content about the importance of political participation, voter rights, civic responsibilities, and the consequences of political disengagement. The X treatment group followed a dedicated X account designed solely for the study. Participants received two concise political engagement tweets weekly, accompanied by relevant graphics and links to educational resources. Both interventions utilised evidence-based political communication strategies and presented factually accurate information about political participation. Immediately following the four-week intervention, the posttest was administered to both groups using the same instrument applied during the pretest.

Analysis of the resulting data was carried out using both descriptive and inferential statistics. Means and standard deviations were computed to address the research questions, while Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was used to test the hypotheses by comparing posttest scores while controlling for pretest performance and accounting for gender differences where applicable. Statistical significance was set at the 0.05 level.

Results

Table 1: Mean and standard deviation analysis of differences in political apathy levels among youths in South-East Nigeria exposed to political engagement messages on Facebook and those exposed through X (formerly Twitter)

Groups	N	Pre-test		Post-test		Mean Reduction	Difference
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
<i>Facebook</i>	25	82.28	4.09	50.36	6.85	31.92	14.06
<i>X</i>	14	68.50	7.16	50.64	9.43	17.86	

Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviation analysis of the differences in political apathy levels among youths exposed to political engagement messages using Facebook and those exposed through X (formerly Twitter) in South-East Nigeria. Youths exposed to political engagement messages through Facebook had a pre-test mean apathy score of 82.28 with a standard deviation of 4.09, and a post-test mean score of 50.36 with a standard deviation of 6.85. This resulted in a mean loss of 31.92. Conversely, youths who received political engagement message exposure

through X recorded a pre-test mean score of 68.50 with a standard deviation of 7.16, and a post-test mean score of 50.64 with a standard deviation of 9.43. Their mean loss was 17.86. A mean loss difference of 14.06 was recorded in favour of youths exposed to political engagement messages via Facebook. This suggests that Facebook-based political engagement messages produced a greater reduction in political apathy levels among youths compared to X-based political engagement messages.

Table 2: Summary of the One-Way Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) on the differences in political apathy levels among youths in South-East Nigeria exposed to political engagement messages on Facebook and those exposed through X (formerly Twitter)

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects						
Dependent Variable: Apathy						
Source	Type III Squares	Sum of df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	
Corrected Model	1787.926 ^a	2	893.963	6.015	.006	
Intercept	10248.394	1	10248.394	68.952	.000	
Pre-Apathy	83.800	1	83.800	.564	.458	
Platform	1693.694	1	1693.694	11.395	.002	
Error	5350.740	36	148.632			
Total	240376.000	39				
Corrected Total	7138.667	38				

a. R Squared = .250 (Adjusted R Squared = .209)

Table 2 presents the One-Way Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) results on the differences in political apathy levels among youths exposed to political engagement messages using Facebook and those exposed through X (formerly Twitter) in South-East Nigeria, while controlling for the influence of pretest scores. After adjusting for the pretest effect, the platform (Facebook vs X) exerted a statistically significant influence on political apathy levels ($F = 11.395, p < .05$). This means that the platform through

which political engagement messages were delivered significantly affected the apathy outcomes of the youths. The model accounted for 25.0% of the variance in political apathy levels ($R^2 = .250$, Adjusted $R^2 = .209$), indicating moderate explanatory power. The ANCOVA result suggests that youths exposed to political engagement messages via Facebook demonstrated significantly lower political apathy levels than those exposed via X, even after controlling for initial differences.

Table 3: Mean and standard deviation analysis of differences in political apathy levels between male and female youths in South-East Nigeria exposed to political engagement messages on Facebook and those exposed through X (formerly Twitter)

Groups	N	Pre-test		Post-test		Mean Reduction	Difference
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD		
Male	18	81.16	7.34	45.38	2.50	35.78	16.55
Female	21	74.04	4.93	54.81	4.83	19.23	

Table 3 presents the mean and standard deviation analysis of the differences in political apathy levels between male and female youths exposed to political engagement messages using Facebook and X (formerly Twitter) in South-East Nigeria. Male youths recorded a pre-test mean apathy score of 81.16 with a standard deviation of 7.34, and a post-test mean score of 45.38 with a standard deviation of 2.50. This yielded a mean loss score of 35.78. In contrast, female youths

obtained a pre-test mean score of 74.04 with a standard deviation of 4.93, and a post-test mean score of 54.81 with a standard deviation of 4.83. Their mean loss score was 19.23. A mean loss difference of 16.55, in favour of the male group, was recorded. This indicates that male youths who received political engagement messages experienced greater reduction in political apathy levels than female youths who received similar messages.

Table 4: Summary of the One-Way Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) on the differences in political apathy levels between male and female youths in South-East Nigeria exposed to political engagement messages on Facebook and those exposed through X (formerly Twitter)

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Apathy

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	491.653 ^a	2	245.826	1.331	.277
Intercept	7160.431	1	7160.431	38.781	.000
Pre-Apathy	.438	1	.438	.002	.961
Gender	397.420	1	397.420	2.152	.151
Error	6647.014	36	184.639		
Total	240376.000	39			
Corrected Total	7138.667	38			

a. R Squared = .069 (Adjusted R Squared = .017)

Table 4 presents the One-Way Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) results examining the differences in political apathy levels between male and female youths exposed to political engagement messages using Facebook and X (formerly Twitter) in South-East Nigeria, while controlling for pre-test apathy scores. After adjusting for pre-existing differences, the main factor (gender) did not produce a statistically significant effect on political apathy levels ($F = 2.152$, $p > .05$). This means that gender did not significantly affect youths' apathy outcomes following exposure to political engagement messages. The model explained 6.9% of the variance in political apathy levels ($R^2 = .069$, Adjusted $R^2 = .017$), indicating weak explanatory power.

Discussion

The study found that Facebook-based political engagement messages produced a greater reduction in political apathy levels among youths compared to X-based political engagement messages. Youths exposed to political engagement content via Facebook demonstrated substantially lower apathy scores in the posttest compared to those exposed through X. This finding suggests that the structural and functional characteristics of Facebook may be more conducive to sustained political engagement than X. Facebook's format allows for longer, more detailed political messages that can incorporate comprehensive information, visual elements, and extended narratives that facilitate deeper processing of political content. The platform's emphasis on social networking and community building may also create a more supportive environment for political discourse, where users feel

more comfortable engaging with political content through comments, shares, and reactions.

The superior effectiveness of Facebook in reducing political apathy may also be attributed to the nature of user interactions on the platform. Facebook groups and pages create semi-permanent spaces where political discussions can develop over time, allowing for sustained engagement with political themes. The algorithmic prioritization of content from groups and pages that users actively engage with ensures repeated exposure to political messages, reinforcing key concepts about civic participation. Additionally, Facebook's multimedia capabilities enable the presentation of political information in varied formats including text, images, infographics, and videos within a single post, catering to different learning preferences and information processing styles. The statistical significance of the platform effect confirms that the choice of social media platform constitutes a critical factor in designing interventions to combat political apathy among Nigerian youth.

The findings of this study align with and diverge from existing literature in important ways. In alignment with the present study, Bode (2012) reported that Facebook's structural features significantly enhanced political participation among young users, demonstrating the platform's effectiveness as a tool for civic engagement. Similarly, Bond et al. (2012) showed that Facebook messages directly influenced political mobilization, corroborating this study's finding regarding Facebook's superior effectiveness. Vitak et al. (2011) also found that exposure to political content on Facebook increased political knowledge and participation among youth, supporting the current



study's results on platform effectiveness. However, in contrast, Bright, Hale, and Margetts (2020) showed that X demonstrated stronger effects on political engagement during campaign periods, suggesting that X's real-time nature might be more effective in specific political contexts than the present study indicates.

The study also found that male youths who received political engagement messages experienced greater reduction in political apathy levels than female youths who received similar messages. Male participants recorded considerably lower posttest apathy scores compared to female participants, indicating differential responses to the intervention. This descriptive finding indicates that male youths responded more positively to political engagement messages across both platforms. The differential response may reflect underlying gender disparities in political socialization processes in South-East Nigeria, where cultural norms often position politics as a predominantly male domain. Male youths may enter political engagement interventions with higher baseline receptivity to political messages due to greater prior exposure to political discussions and expectations of future political participation. Female youths, conversely, may require additional interventions that address gender-specific barriers to political engagement beyond mere exposure to political content.

However, the hypothesis results revealed that gender did not significantly affect youths' apathy outcomes following exposure to political engagement messages. Despite the observable descriptive differences in apathy reduction between male and female participants, the statistical analysis controlling for pretest scores indicated that gender differences were not statistically significant. This finding suggests that while male youths showed greater numerical reductions in apathy, the difference was not substantial enough to conclude a systematic gender-based differential response to social media political messages. The weak explanatory power of the gender model further indicates that gender alone accounts for minimal variance in political apathy outcomes. This result implies that social media political engagement messages have comparable potential effectiveness for both male and female youths when preexisting apathy levels are taken into account, challenging assumptions about inherently gendered responses to digital political communication. Xenos, Vromen, and Loader (2014) reported significant gender differences in how social

media impacts political engagement, contradicting this study's non-significant gender effect. Conversely, Conroy, Feezell, and Guerrero (2012) suggested that social media platforms reduce gender gaps in political participation, which aligns with this study's finding that gender did not significantly differentiate apathy outcomes when controlling for baseline levels.

Conclusion

Based on the findings, the study concluded that Facebook demonstrates superior effectiveness compared to X in reducing political apathy among youths in South-East Nigeria, with the platform through which political engagement messages are delivered constituting a significant determinant of intervention outcomes. While descriptive data revealed that male youths experienced greater reductions in political apathy levels than female youths, statistical analysis controlling for baseline apathy indicated that gender does not significantly moderate the effectiveness of social media political messages. The study establishes that social media platforms, particularly Facebook, represent viable tools for combating youth political disengagement in South-East Nigeria, though platform selection matters considerably for intervention success. The comparable effectiveness across genders when controlling for preexisting conditions suggests that social media interventions can reach both male and female youths effectively, challenging assumptions about gendered responses to digital political communication. These findings contribute empirical evidence supporting the integration of social media strategies into broader efforts aimed at enhancing democratic participation among Nigerian youth, while highlighting the importance of platform-specific characteristics in determining intervention effectiveness.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the researcher recommended that:

1. Political mobilization organizations, civil society groups, and governmental agencies seeking to reduce political apathy among youths in South-East Nigeria should prioritize Facebook over X as the primary platform for delivering political engagement messages, given its demonstrated superior effectiveness in reducing apathy levels.



2. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and youth-focused NGOs should incorporate Facebook-based political education campaigns into their voter mobilization strategies, utilizing the platform's multimedia capabilities and community-building features to create sustained political engagement among young citizens.

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